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activity.	 This	 includes	 their	 appreciation	 of	 their	 own	 deliberations,	
choices,	reactions,	and	movements.
The	aesthetics	of	our	own	actions	are	already	a	natural	part	of	the	
rich	 experience	 of	 our	 lives.	 And	 the	 arts	 of	 action	 already	 exist	 in	
plenty;	we	are	surrounded	by	them.	Many	of	our	artifacts	are	designed	
for	the	sake	of	encouraging	and	structuring	the	aesthetics	of	actions.	
Games,	 cities,	 food	 rituals,	 social	 dances,	 and	 more	—	all	 are	 forms	
which	sculpt	activity,	often	for	aesthetic	ends.	But	these	arts	have	been	
inadequately	 appreciated	 in	 theoretical	 work	 on	 art	 and	 aesthetics,	
and	often	ignored	in	much	public	reflection	on	the	value	of	the	arts.	
They	are	rarely	called	“arts”,	but,	I	argue,	they	deserve	to	be.	
Consider	 rock	 climbing.	 Rock	 climbing	 is	 a	 profoundly	 aesthetic	
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the Wu Tang (36 Chambers) which	is	full	of	eerie	aural	space	and	satis-
fyingly	unhinged	rhythm.	The	arts	of	action,	on	 the	other	hand,	are	
marked	by	distinctively	self-reflective	aesthetic	appreciation.	In	these	
arts,	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 appreciator’s	 aesthetic	 attention	 is	 on	 the	 aes-
thetic	qualities	of	their	own	actions.	
The	term	‘action’	—	though	in	some	ways	the	most	evocative	of	my	
interest	—	is	 philosophically	 fraught,	 and	 some	 of	 its	 colloquial	 con-
notations	are	a	bit	narrow	for	my	purposes.	Let	me	switch	to	a	slightly	









lems	 of	 the	 world	 (Osborne	 1964).	 Rock	 climbing	 and	 chess,	 I	 will	
argue,	are	examples	of	the	arts of	action.	They	are	practices	oriented	
around	 designing	 artifacts	 and	 procedures,	 which	 sculpt,	 encourage,	
and	call	forth	aesthetic	experiences	of	doing.












schema	for	 the	arts:	 that	of	 the	arts	of	action.	 In	 that	schema,	some	
person	 (or	 persons)	 makes	 an	 artifact.	 (We	 might	 as	 well	 call	 them	
the	artist,	 though	we	could	 just	as	easily	call	 them	something	else.)	
The	artifact	is	intended	as	a	prompt	for	further	activity.	Others	come	
along	and	engage	with	the	artifact,	letting	it	prompt	them	into	an	ac-
tivity	 whose	 contours	 are	 partially	 determined	 by	 that	 artifact.	 And	
then	those	participants	appreciate	the	aesthetic	qualities	which	arise	
in	their	own	actions.	This	schema	differs	sharply	from	the	first	schema	


























agent-driven	 activities.	 It	 has	 ignored	 the	 possibility	 that	 we	 might	
make	 artifacts	 in	 order	 to	 shape	 experiences	 of	 process	 aesthetics.	
Theorists	 of	 everyday	 aesthetics	 seem	 to	 presume	 that	 process	 aes-
thetics	 is	 somehow	 incompatible	 with	 the	 practices	 of	 art-making.	








6.	 Much	 of	 this	 work	 has	 been	 made	 possible	 by	 earlier	 work	 on	 bodily	 per-
ception	and	the	possibility	of	an	aesthetics	of	bodily	senses,	including	work	
on	 proprioceptive	 experiences	 of	 dance	 (Montero	 2006).	 Also	 crucial	 has	
















































the	active	audience?	 In	what	 follows,	 I	offer	a	 theory	of	 the	process	
arts	and	make	first	attempts	at	answering	these	questions.	I	argue	that	
the	process	arts	are	a	viable,	and	important,	category	of	the	arts.	I	give	
a	 general	 account	 of	 the	 basic	 difference	 between	 process	 arts	 and	
object	 arts,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 prescribed	 focus	 of	 aesthetic	 attention.	 I	
give	an	account	of	the	place	of	the	artist	in	the	process	arts,	and	argue	
that	we	can	often	attribute	significant	responsibility	for	the	aesthetic	






I	 am	 not	 particularly	 attached	 to	 it.	 For	 my	 purposes,	 the	 important	
claims	 are	 that	 we	 humans	 engage	 in	 practices	 of	 making	 artifacts	








that	 these	 artifacts	 are	 quite	 similar	 to	 the	 traditional	 object	 arts	 in	




calling	 the	 “object	 arts”,	 and	 wishes	 to	 use	 some	 other	 term	 for	 the	
























traditional	arts.	 Furthermore,	 those	artifacts	 help	 to	 stabilize	 certain	
experiences	of	action	and	make	them	more	intersubjectively	sharable.	
The	aesthetics	of	action	are	not	simply	confined	to	everyday	activity;	
they	 can	 be	 intentionally	 called	 forth	 and	 sculpted	 through	 artistic	
practice.	There	can	be	arts	of	action.7 












A	 survey	 of	 various	 theoretical	 approaches	 to	 games	 will	 serve	
here	as	a	useful	case	study,	to	help	us	to	get	a	grip	on	the	dominance	






moting	 mere	 player	 absorption	 in	 the	 instrumentalities	 of	 play,	 and	
start,	instead,	to	represent	the	world	in	a	meaningful	way.	Sharp,	for	
example,	points	to	Mary	Flanagan’s	game	Career Moves,	which	repro-





of	 much	 contemporary	 art	—	such	 as	 offering	 social	 critiques	 (Flana-
gan	2009).	The	pattern	of	argument	here	is	clear:	for	games	to	be	an	
art,	there	must	be	some	sort	of	valuable	representational	content	that	
we	 can	 attribute	 to	 the	 game	 itself.	 Notice	 that	 in	 all	 of	 these	 cases,	
the	valuable	qualities	that	make	the	game	art	are	attributable	to	the	
artifact	itself	—	its	mechanics,	its	representation	of	the	world,	and	the	
commentary	 embedded	 in	 the	 rules	 of	 its	 simulation.	 Here,	 the	 art-







2. Games, tango, cooking, cities
It	will	be	useful	to	step	back	from	philosophical	theorizing	for	a	mo-
ment	 and	 survey	 some	 representative	 process	 arts.	 First,	 games	 are	
clear	examples	of	a	process	art.	I	mean	games	in	the	broad	sense,	in-














players	 an	 opportunity	 for	 rich,	 interesting	 choices,	 for	 thrilling	 ac-








games	 as	 a	 process	 art.	 However,	 when	 we	 move	 to	 the	 theoretical	
discussion	 of	 game	 aesthetics,	 and	 various	 attempts	 to	 demonstrate	
that	games	are	a	valuable	form	of	art,	the	discussion	usually	switches	
to	object-aesthetic	elements	—	like	graphics,	sound,	fixed	scripts,	and	








ing	 a	 city	 like	 Istanbul,	 full	 of	 lovely	 winding	 streets	 and	 delightful	






indoor	marketplace.	The	 layout	of	 the	city	 conditions	 the	quality	of	
these	choices.10 
hand,	non-philosophical	discussion	of	games	often	focuses	on	the	aesthetics	







such	 performances	 (Robson	 2018).	 Notably,	 some	 writers	 outside	 of	 philo-
sophical	aesthetics	have	directed	attention	to	the	aesthetics	of	action,	most	











10.	 The	 phenomenology	 of	 city	 walking	 has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 much	 study,	
though	 most	 of	 it	 outside	 of	 analytic	 aesthetics.	 For	 an	 overview	 of	 conti-










actions.	 The	 player’s	 activity	 shows	 up	 in	 Tavinor	 simply	 as	 means	
to	 further	 the	 ends	 of	 immersion	 in	 the	 fiction.	 A	 player’s	 struggles	






















9.	 This	 discussion	 of	 the	 videogames	 literature	 is	 merely	 a	 sketch	 of	 a	 much	
more	 detailed	 discussion	 I’ve	 offered	 elsewhere	 (Nguyen	 2017b;	 Nguyen	
2020).	For	another	take	on	that	literature,	see	(Tavinor	2010).	On	the	other	




er	—	that’s	 a	 very	 pleasant	 social	 form.	 (Kaltenbrunner	
1984,	11)


























However,	 cooking	 at	 its	 most	 primal	 is	 not	 consciously	









They	 improvise.	 They	 dance	 for	 themselves,	 introspec-
tively.	 Shunning	 the	 external	 world,	 their	 eyes	 turn	









hide	 behind	 choreographed	 steps.	 Beauty	 radiates	 from	
the	 emotions	 inside	 the	 dancers,	 not	 from	 external	 dis-
plays	of	skill.	(Dujovne	2011,	5–6)
True	 tango	dancers	dance	 for	 themselves.	They	appreciate	 their	 rap-
port	with	 their	partner,	 the	sense	of	connection	and	responsiveness,	
the	absorption	in	the	collective	improvisation	of	movement.	
Similarly,	 consider	contact	 improvisation,	a	dance	 form	 in	which	
the	 dancers	 play	 with	 gravity	 by	 putting	 their	 weight	—	and	 their	
trust	—	on	 another	 person,	 rolling	 around	 each	 other’s	 bodies	 and	
perpetually	falling	towards	each	other	(Bigé	2017).	Steve	Paxton,	the	
dancer	who	originated	the	practice,	explains:
Just	 the	 pleasure	 of	 moving	 and	 the	 pleasure	 of	 using	
your	 body	 is,	 I	 think,	 maybe	 the	 main	 point.	 And	 the	
pleasure	of	dancing	with	somebody	in	an	unplanned	and	





The	part	 she	 remembers	with	 the	most	 fondness	and	nostalgia,	 she	
says,	was	 the	hours-long	argument	amongst	 the	 twelve	members	of	
her	family,	all	gathered	around	their	single	waffle-maker,	about	who	
had	 the	 rights	 to	 the	next	waffle	[Waerebeek	1996].)	 If	one	 thought	
that	there	could	be	an	aesthetic	experience	of	social	interaction,	then	



























tinual	 tension	 between	 the	 fire’s	 hunger	 and	 your	 own	























What’s	 more,	 many	 food	 rituals	 structure,	 through	 their	 physical-

















Finally,	 I	 focus	 largely	on	pure	examples	—	artifacts	and	practices	
that	are	almost	entirely	object	art	or	process	art.	But	this	 focus	is	 in-
tended	only	to	help	us	start	to	get	a	grip	on	these	categories.	Actual	
artistic	practice	 is	 full	of	all	 sorts	of	hybrids	between	 the	 two	 forms.	
Many	videogames	invite	process-aesthetic	appreciation	of	the	player’s	
own	 actions,	 but	 also	 object-aesthetic	 appreciation	 of	 the	 graphics,	
the	music,	and	pre-generated	elements	of	storyline.	And	such	features	
can	harmonize	and	blend	in	fascinating	ways,	as	when	a	videogame’s	
soundtrack	 dynamically	 adjusts	 to	 the	 player’s	 actions,	 emphasizing	
the	drama	and	danger	of	 the	situation.	And	 I	 suspect	 that	 there	are	
many	artistic	practices	that,	though	object-centric,	also	have	substan-
tial	 process-aesthetic	 qualities.	 For	 example:	 our	 involvement	 with	
detective	 novels	 typically	 involves	 not	 only	 appreciation	 of	 object-
features	 like	 character	 and	 plot,	 but	 a	 self-reflective	 appreciation	 of	
our	own	process	of	puzzling	through	the	mystery.	And	when	we	try	to	
understand	the	aesthetic	value	of	such	a	hybrid	work	within	a	theory	
built	only	 for	 the	object	arts,	 then	we	will	 inevitably	misunderstand	
key	features	of	that	work.	
3. Process art: A theory
First,	 I	 define	 process aesthetics	 as	 the	 aesthetics	 of	 activity	 from	 the	
perspective	of	 the	actors.	This	 includes	 the	overtly	self-reflective	ex-
periences	of	each	actor’s	own	activity.	Process	aesthetics	also	includes	
those	experiences	of	 the	outside	world	 that	are	related	to	 that	activ-
ity	—	such	as	a	cook	monitoring	 the	smells	and	sounds	and	color	of	
their	 sautéing	 vegetables,	 to	 determine	 when	 they’re	 ready.	 Process	
But	the	activity	of	cooking	is	itself	part	of	the	content	of	a	cookbook.	
The	activity	of	cooking	is	a	product	of	intentional	design,	attributable	
to	 a	 cookbook’s	 author.	 One	 might	 then	 protest	 that	 the	 object-aes-





All	 of	 my	 examples	 lie	 at	 the	 periphery	 of	 what	 is	 normally	 con-
sidered	art,	and	belong	to	practices	that	are	rarely	granted	the	respect	
generally	accorded	to	 the	 traditional	arts.	This	 is	part	of	 the	point.	 I	
think	the	historical	focus	on	the	object	arts	has	induced	a	relative	ne-





arts	 and	 marginalize	 the	 process	 arts.	 I	 grant,	 furthermore,	 that	 our	























Process	 art	 involves	 a	 more	 distanced	 relationship	 between	 art-
ist	and	enactor	than	object	art	does	between	artist	and	audience.	In	
the	 object	 arts,	 the	 artist	 creates	 a	 work	 which	 the	 audience	 experi-
ences.	The	audience	experiences	aesthetic	properties	as	in	or	adhering 















16.	 I	 originally	 introduced	 the	 terms	 ‘object	 art’,	 ‘process	 art’,	 ‘enactor’,	 ‘artist’s	
work’,	and	‘attentive	focus’	in	a	very	brief	sketch	in	my	book,	Games: Agency as 
Art	(Nguyen	2020,	142–144).	Though	Games	bears	a	similar	publication	date	
to	the	present	article,	due	to	the	complexities	of	book	publishing,	those	parts	






























ational	community,	 such	as	 the	one	 that	originated	 the	social	 tango	




















it	 feels	 like	 to	 react,	how	exactly	 the	pieces	of	 the	solution	come	 to	

















also,	 the	 differences	 between	 a	 more	 object-art	 dance	 practice,	 like	






















or	very	close	 to	 it.	The	painter	creates	a	painting,	and	 the	audience	
attends	to	that	painting.	In	process	art,	the	designer’s	work	and	the	at-
tentive	focus	come	apart.	The	designer’s	work	is	the	artifact:	the	game,	
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of	dance.	Some	practices	of	dance,	 such	as	ballet,	 are	 largely	 in	 the	
domain	of	object	art,	where	others,	 like	 the	social	 tango,	are	 largely	
in	the	domain	of	process	art.	But	surely	there	are	ballet	dancers	who	

































sider,	 for	 example,	 more	 game-like	 fictions,	 such	 as	 mystery	 novels.	




presume	that	the	work	of	art	 is	some	external	artifact.	 I	 take	this	to	be	the	
dominant	view,	and	 the	most	plausible	one.	Some	other	accounts,	such	as	
that	 of	 R.	G.	 Collingwood,	 claim	 that	 the	 work	 of	 art	 is	 constructed	 in	 the	
imagination	of	the	viewer	(Collingwood	1938).	Space	does	not	permit	me	to	
address	that	family	of	views	here.










determine	 that	 aesthetic	 quality	 in	 its	 full	 specificity.	 The	 designers	































ish	 breakfasts	 are	 simply	 creating	 the	 background	 and	 the	 tools	 for	
artistry.	The	designers	aren’t	any	sort	of	artists	at	all.	Instead,	it	is	the	
enactors	—	the	players,	walkers,	and	diners	—	who	are	the	true	artists.	











count	 for	 the	difference	 in	aesthetic	 responsibility	between,	say,	 the	
designers	of	a	computer	game	versus	the	designers	of	a	word-process-
ing	program.	The	team	that	designs	a	word	processor	is	making	the	
tools	 for	 other	 artists	 to	 write	 their	 various	 artistic	 masterpieces	 on.	
But	surely	the	designer	of	the	word	processor	isn’t	an	artist.	They	don’t	





























considerations	 of	 the	 game-task;	 the	 aesthetic	 qualities	 are	 uninten-
tional	by-products	of	their	attempts	to	win.22	Similarly,	the	city-walker	




experiences.	The	enactor	 pursues	 some	other	 aim,	 like	winning	 the	
game	or	finding	a	late-night	snack.	For	the	enactor,	the	aesthetic	quali-
ties	can	arise	 indirectly,	as	a	 result	of	activity	aimed	at	 some	 locally	
22.	 In	some	cases,	the	player	may	have	initially	decided	to	play	the	game	for	the	
sake	 of	 aesthetic	 experience,	 but	 during	 game-play,	 they	 are	 not	 choosing	


















difficult	 set	 of	 obstacles	 in	 your	 virtual	 path,	 which	 you	 must	 solve	
with	only	your	wormhole	gun.	Solving	these	puzzles	is	a	fascinating,	
mind-bending	delight,	in	which	gorgeous	solutions	finally	emerge	for	















21.	 Such	 a	 view	 is	 advanced	 by	 Paul	 Crowther,	 who	 says	 the	 digital	 arts	 are	
unique	in	that	their	users	also	count	as	co-creators	(Crowther	2008).






































Who	exactly	 is	 the	artist,	 then,	 in	a	given	piece	of	process	art?	 It	














Expanded conception of the artist:	The	artist	is	the	per-
son	 who	 has	 an	 aesthetic	 insight	—	which	 is	 an	 insight	
that	certain	aesthetic	properties	would	depend	on	certain	
non-aesthetic	 properties	—	and	 who	 imbues	 some	 work	
of	art	with	aesthetic	properties	or the power to bring about 








those	 aesthetic	 properties.	 The	 expanded	 conception	 only	 relaxes	
Zangwill’s	implicit	demand	that	those	aesthetic	properties	emerge	in	
the	work	itself.












tured,	 more	 freeform	 aesthetic	 experiences	—	ones	 unconstricted	 by	
the	prescriptions	found	in	the	traditional	arts.	
Says	 Saito:	 in	 the	 standard	 practice	 of	 art,	 there	 is	 a	 prescriptive	
frame	around	works	of	art.	That	is,	there	are	prescriptions	for	a	proper	










Let’s	 call	 anything	 that	 has	 such	 an	 attentional	 frame	 a	 “framed	




in	 some	 prescription-bound	 class.	 In	 other	 cases,	 prescriptions	 are	
overtly	 declared	 by	 the	 artist,	 such	 as	 when	 a	 contemporary	 avant-
garde	 artist	 instructs	 their	 audience	 to	 roll	 around	 in	 their	 museum	
























Hybrid process arts: the	arts	where	the	designer	and	enac-






























Saito	 is	 surely	 right	 that	 our	 everyday	 experience	 is	 full	 of	 un-











corn	 between	 battles.	 Other	 forms	 of	 process	 art	 also	 involve	 some	








Moby Dick. These	prescriptions	only	fix	the	nature	of	what	Moby Dick 
is:	it	is	not	a	piece	of	physical	material	to	be	appreciated	in	all	its	physi-
cality.	Nor	is	it	a	collection	of	words	to	be	accessed	at	any	order,	like	a	
dictionary.	The	work	consists	of	a	set	of	words to be read in a particular 












































Interestingly,	 much	 of	 the	 aesthetic	 frame	 in	 traditional	 works	
arises	from	practice-based	prescriptions.	We	know,	through	familiarity	
with	the	social	practice,	that	we	are	supposed	to	attend	to	the	words	
of	 the	 novel	 and	 not	 to	 its	 smell.	 However,	 some	 process	 arts	 offer	
what	we	might	call	a	 functional frame.	That	 is,	 the	enactor’s	attention	



















































the	 experience	 is	 my	 skilled	 navigation	 of	 the	 challenges.	 The	 core	
elements	of	these	sorts	of	games	are	failure,	the	development	of	skill,	
and	 the	 deployment	 of	 skill	 during	 repeated	 attempts	 to	 overcome	

















stable	 object	 which	 our	 activities	 reveal	—	on	 the	 algorithm,	 the	 vir-






6. Aren’t we really just looking at the artifact, in the end?
Finally,	 one	 might	 insist	 that	 the	 process	 arts	 are	 not	 really	 distinct	
from	the	object	arts.	Perhaps	what	we	are	doing,	with	all	of	our	activ-
ity	with	games	and	food,	is	simply	a	way	for	us	to	come	to	terms	with	
the	 object	 itself.	 Lopes	 explores	 such	 a	 possibility	 in	 his	 account	 of	
interactive	computer	art.	Suppose	I	am	using	a	 joystick	 to	explore	a	

















Jenefer	 Robinson	 says,	 treats	 movement	 as	 merely	 a	 means	 for	 con-
structing	“a	mental	representation	of	the	form	of	a	building	considered	
as	a	static	structure”	(Robinson	2012,	343).27 
26.	This	 discussion	 of	 Lopes	 is	 drawn	 from	 my	 discussion	 in	 (Nguyen	 2020,	
145–146).
27.	 Consider,	on	the	other	hand,	Robinson’s	own	account	of	the	place	of	move-
ment	 in	 architecture.	 She	 insists	 that	 we	 must	 not	 only	 look	 or	 imagine	 a	










would	 be	 less	 important.	 The	 transparency	 thesis	 renders	 aestheti-
cally	unimportant	those	actions	primarily	attributable	to	the	enactor’s	
own	 special	 creativity	 or	 ability,	 since	 they	 would	 be	 not	 be	 object-
revealing.	 But	 this	 runs	 against	 core	 features	 of	 the	 actual	 practices	
we’ve	been	looking	at.	In	many	of	these	practices,	participants	praise	





own	 solution.	 Turkish	 breakfast	 is	 wonderful	 because	 the	 eater	 has	
a	luxurious	sense	of	freedom,	as	they	can	tweak	every	bite	to	match	
exactly	their	heart’s	desire	in	the	moment.	The	social	tango	is	beloved	
for	 giving	 rise	 to	 particular	 intimacies	 that	 are	 unique	 to	 each	 pair	
















role-playing	 games,	 which	 provide	 both	 beautiful	 environments	 for	
the	 player	 to	 freely	 explore,	 and	 frequent	 challenges	 that	 focus	 the	
player’s	attention	on	their	own	activity.	
Suppose,	 then,	 that	 we	 accept	 that	 in	 the	 practices	 I’ve	 de-
scribed	—	games,	 social	 tango,	 cooking	—	I	 am,	 in	 fact,	 orienting	 my	









through	 our	 processes	 just	 in	 order	 to	 get	 a	 better	 aesthetic	 handle	










transparency	 thesis,	 reflective	attention	 to	our	own	action	 is	part	of	
aesthetic	appreciation	only	insofar	is	it	reveals	aesthetic	properties	of	
the	 object.	 Thus,	 in	 appreciating	 an	 object	 through	 our	 activity,	 we	
should	 look	 primarily	 to	 the	 object-revealing	 features	 in	 our	 action.	
Take,	for	example,	a	rock	climb	in	which	a	particular	movement	was	
forced	 by	 the	 climb	 as	 the	 only	 movement	 that	 would	 allow	 prog-
ress.	 That	 forced	 move	 is	 closely	 tied	 to	 the	 object	 and	 thus	 highly	




There	 is,	 of	 course,	 a	 sliding	 scale.	 The	 more	 rigidly	 delineated	
the	space	of	actions,	 the	closer	 those	experiences	will	be.	Some	vid-
eogames,	 such	 as	 Dragon’s Lair, offer	 simple	 reflex	 challenges	 in	 a	
fixed	sequence.	Similarly,	some	rock	climbing	problems	require	such	
specific	and	precise	movements	 to	succeed	 that	 rock	climbers	often	




























7. The status of process art: On sharing experiences
Why	 have	 we	 traditionally	 emphasized	 the	 object	 arts	 over	 the	 pro-
cess	arts?	A	complete	diagnosis,	I	suspect,	will	draw	significantly	on	
the	resources	of	cultural	and	intellectual	history,	sociology,	economics,	
and	 more.	 Here,	 I	 will	 examine	 a	 few	 philosophical	 sources	 for	 the	
historical	preference	for	the	object	arts,	and	then	give	some	defenses	
of	 the	process	arts.	These	final	sections	of	 this	paper	should	be	con-








attentive	focus.	Obviously	this	 is	 true	with	enactor	process	arts,	 like	
tango,	but	it	is	also	true	for	artist	process	arts,	like	games.	Even	when	
the	 designers	 have	 tightly	 constrained	 the	 choice	 space	 to	 give	 the	
player’s	activity	very	specific	aesthetic	qualities	—	still,	different	game	
players	have	different	skills	and	make	different	choices.	The	precise	






might	 think,	of	a	graceful	drawing,	 that	 the	gracefulness	was	 in	 the	
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8. The status of process art: Cognitively, merit, and uniqueness





	 First,	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 aesthetic	 experiences,	 by	 their	













31.	 I	 am	 using	 ‘aesthetic	 experience’	 here	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 brevity;	 some	 of	 the	
theories	I	am	discussing	speak	in	terms	of	a	distinctive	character	to	“aesthetic	
appreciation”	or	“aesthetic	judgment”.	Nothing	I	say	here	turns	on	the	differ-


















of	much	process	art	 is	 that	 it	makes	significant	room	for	 the	agency	




experiences	 of	 agency	 with	 very	 much	 the	 same	 character.	 Players	
typically	come	up	with	very	different	particular	solutions	to	particular	









periences	 of	 our	 own	 free	 choice.	 What	 having	 framed	 process	 arts	
gets	 us	 is	 not	 precise	 shareability,	 in	 these	 cases,	 but	 some	 near	 ap-
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way.	 Perhaps	 the	 problem	 with	 process	 art	 is	 that	 its	 artworks	 lack	
uniqueness.	If	the	value	of	a	process	artwork	is	not	in	the	artwork	it-





unique	value,	 their	 features	 too	separable	 from	the	aesthetic	proper-
ties,	which	occur	far	downstream	of	the	artifact.	Thus,	we	might	con-
clude,	there	can	be	no	such	thing	as	process	artworks.
But	 I	 do	 think	 process	 artworks	 can	 often	 have	 a	 sort	 of	 unique-
ness,	though	one	that	comes	via	a	more	complex	series	of	stages	than	
with	object	artworks.	The	particular	qualities	of	a	process	artwork	can	
uniquely	 inform	 the	 aesthetic	 activities	 they	 inspire.	 The	 activity	 of	
solving	a	chess	puzzle	cannot	be	had	outside	of	chess.	Any	aesthet-
ic	 value	 that	 we	 find	 in	 the	 player’s	 chess	 activities,	 insofar	 as	 they	
are	unique	to	that	enactor’s	engagement	with	chess,	is	also	unique	to	
chess.	And	the	exact	nature	of	that	aesthetic	value	is	informed	by	the	
particularities	 of	 chess’	 design.	 Let’s	 call	 this	 feature	 aesthetic depen-
dence.	An	activity	 is	aesthetically	dependent	on	an	artifact	when	the	
precise	aesthetic	character	of	 that	activity	 is	dependent	on	 its	being	
evoked	 by	 that	 particular	 artifact.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 process	 arts	 have	
























arts,	 that	 independent	 state	of	affairs	 is	 the	enactor’s	activity,	which	
is	distinct	from	the	enactor’s	experience	of	that	activity.	Doing	some-
thing	is	distinct	from	one’s	experience	of	doing	it.	




a	different	artwork.	There	 is	no	 substitute	 for	 the	experience	of	 the	
Wu-Tang	 Clan’s	 rap	 masterpiece	 Enter the Wu Tang (36 Chambers); its	
value	is	inextricably	specific	to	its	exact	content	and	aesthetic	proper-
ties.	Another	work,	like	Bill	Evans’	Sunday at the Village Vanguard,	might	
also	be	a	masterpiece,	but	it	does	not	offer	an	alternate	route	to	the	
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without	 reference	 to	 the	 particular	 rules	 of	 the	 game	 in	 which	 they	
occurred.	A	leap	is	not	necessarily	a	game	action,	and	the	beauty	of	




by	 the	 game	 rules.	 If	 a	 particular	 game-action	 is	 beautiful	 as a game 
action,	 then	 that	 aesthetic	 activity	 is	 aesthetically	 dependent	 on	 the	
game.	If	the	loveliness	of	my	dunk	shot	arises	not	from	the	movements	
themselves,	but	from	the	movements	understood	as	moves	within	the	























particular	 process	 artwork	 that	 inspired	 it.	 In	 those	 cases,	 the	 value	
of	 the	 activity	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 process	 artwork	 which	 provides	
the	 unique	 condition	 for	 its	 existence.	 Notice	 that	 the	 structures	 of	
the	uniqueness	relationships	are	different	between	the	object	and	pro-
cess	arts.	The	uniqueness	relationship	in	object	arts	is,	conceivably,	a	
one-to-one	relationship.	Here	is	one	pair:	the	work	Enter the Wu Tang 





Not	 all	 process	 arts	 will	 give	 rise	 to	 aesthetic	 dependence,	 but	
many	do.	The	most	obvious	cases	of	aesthetic	dependence	are	games.	
In	Bernard	Suits’	 influential	analysis,	games	turn	out	 to	be	activities	
constituted	 by	 the	 specified	 constraints	 and	 goals	—	the	 rules	 of	 the	
game.	In	other	words,	a	set	of	game	rules	brings	into	being	new	sorts	












ences	 to	 the	 specific	 rules	 and	 constraints	 of	 basketball.	 This	 is	 not	
true	for	all	action	and	movement.	I	could	leap	with	elegance	and	flair,	
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